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THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON CORPORATE REPUTATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN 
ABSTRACT  
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the influence of firms’ ownership structure 
on corporate reputation. 
Research Findings/ Insights: Using archival data from a panel of firms in Spain for 2000–
2007, we found that ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder erodes 
corporate reputation, whereas contestability of the main shareholder’s power enhances it. 
Insider ownership shows a non-linear relationship with corporate reputation, with lower 
corporate reputation at low and very high levels of insider ownership. Finally, if the largest 
shareholder is either a pressure-resistant or a pressure-sensitive institutional investor, as 
opposed to other types of largest shareholder, corporate reputation is lower. This last 
finding markedly differentiates our sample of firms in Spain, a civil law country, from 
firms in common law countries such as the USA and the UK, where studies have found a 
positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate reputation. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Drawing on signaling and agency theories, our paper 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyze the influence of ownership structure on 
corporate reputation in civil law countries.  
Practitioners/Policy Implications: This study suggests that managers and directors should 
recognize how each characteristic of ownership structure influences the expectations of 
stakeholders. Low levels of ownership concentration in the hands of the largest 
shareholders, low differences in ownership concentration between first and second largest 
shareholders, and moderate levels of insider ownership are positive signals that should be 
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 2 
communicated to foster corporate reputation. High levels of ownership concentration in the 
hands of the largest shareholders or high differences in ownership concentration between 
first and second largest shareholders impair corporate reputation and should be 
compensated by introducing corporate governance mechanisms that favor corporate 
reputation, such as increasing the number of independent directors or avoiding CEO duality  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a large body of research analyzing the influence of ownership structure on 
firm outcomes (e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; Miguel, 
Pindado, & Torre, 2004; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Tribó, Berrone, & Surroca, 
2007). Among these outcomes, several researchers have shown that ownership structure 
may affect corporate reputation (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). The analysis of the influence of ownership structure on 
corporate reputation is relevant since corporate reputation influences stakeholders’ 
responses toward the firm. For instance, corporate reputation affects a customer’s choice 
among competing products (Akerlof, 1970), increases customer retention (Caminity, 1992; 
Selnes, 1994) and premium price (Shapiro, 1983), makes the firm an employer of choice 
(Stigler, 1962; Williamson, 1985), reduces contracting and monitoring costs because 
suppliers and partners are less concerned about contractual hazards (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992); and also supports new product introductions and recovery strategies in the event of 
crisis (Dowling, 2001). In this sense, corporate reputation affects a firm’s future financial 
performance (e.g., Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Vergin & Quoronfleh, 1998). 
However, the few studies analyzing the influence of ownership structure on 
corporate reputation (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990) have focused only on common law countries and on the impact of 
institutional ownership. Furthermore, they have considered institutional owners as a 
homogeneous group. Their evidence suggests three research issues that we address below. 
First, we consider how this evidence applies in civil law countries, where large 
blockholders have an active role in corporate behavior.1 Second, we argue that ownership 
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structure characteristics other than institutional ownership also influence corporate 
reputation. Finally, since different types of institutional investors may behave differently 
(e.g., Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, & Parrino, 2006; Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988; 
Kochhar & Davbid, 1996; Ruiz-Mallorqui & Santana-Martín, 2009), we examine how 
different types of institutional investors may differently influence corporate reputation. 
The literature has provided several definitions of corporate reputation. Wartick 
(1992:34) defined corporate reputation as “the aggregation of a single stakeholder’s 
perceptions of how well organizational responses are meeting the demands and 
expectations of many organizational stakeholders.” Following similar arguments, Fombrun 
(2002:9) proposed that “corporate reputation is the collective representation of a company’s 
past actions and future prospects that describes how key resource providers interpret a 
company’s initiatives and assess its ability to deliver valued outcomes.” Finally, Waddock 
(2000:323) proposed that reputation is the “organization’s perceived capacity to meet its 
stakeholders’ expectations.” These definitions show, first, that corporate reputation is based 
on expectations about the ability of a firm to satisfy its stakeholders and, second, that it is 
built by the aggregation of all stakeholders’ expectations. 
Satisfaction of every stakeholder rests not only on the fact that the firm generates 
enough value, but also on a balanced distribution of value among stakeholders (Charreaux 
& Desbrières, 2001; Jensen, 2001), since resources expropriated by one stakeholder are not 
available to serve the interests of the rest (Clarkson, 1995; John & Senbet, 1998). Because 
of information asymmetries, these stakeholders use different informational cues or signals – 
e.g., firm performance, size, or age – in order to generate their expectations about the firm’s 
ability to satisfy their interests (Brammer & Millington, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Therefore, any characteristic of the firm that has been 
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perceived as influencing future expropriation within the firm will serve as a signal that 
affects corporate reputation. 
These signals that stakeholders use to build their expectations are influenced by the 
institutional context (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; Wright & Rwabizambuga, 2006). Thus 
one may suspect that the surge of concern raised by corporate scandals, the consequent 
interest in good governance as a determinant of firm behavior, and the more frequent 
presence and the relevance of large shareholders in civil law countries (Faccio & Lang, 
2002; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1998; López de Foronda, López, & Santamaría, 2007) have favored considering 
ownership structure as one of the determinants of expectations about firms’ future behavior. 
This ability of ownership structure to generate expectations makes it not only a corporate 
governance mechanism, but also a factor influencing the accumulation of one firm 
resource: corporate reputation.  
Drawing on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and signaling theory 
(Spence, 1974), we provide theoretical arguments and empirically analyze the influence of 
firm ownership structure on corporate reputation in Spain. We focus on four characteristics 
of a firm’s ownership structure that we consider the most visible to stakeholders: degree of 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest and the second largest shareholders, 
insider ownership – i.e., ownership in the hands of executive and ex-executive directors – 
and the type of the largest shareholder. By distinguishing among different types of 
shareholders and by examining a civil law country, our analysis complements previous 
research by Fombrun and Shanley (1990), Brammer and Millington (2005), and Brammer 
and Pavelin (2006), which has focused only on the impact of institutional ownership in 
common law countries.  
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Spain is an interesting setting for our study for several reasons. First, Spain is a 
typical civil law country, with concentration of ownership in the hands of a few large 
blockholders who are influential in organizational behavior (Miguel et al., 2004; Tribó et 
al., 2007) and thus should have a large and distinctive influence on stakeholders’ 
expectations. Second, in Spain banks have traditionally maintained a large presence in 
firms, not only as creditors but also as controlling shareholders (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-
Aguiar, 2009). This large presence of banks, also common in other civil law countries, 
allows us to distinguish among different types of institutional investors in our analyses. 
Third, during the last decades the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (Spanish 
National Stock Exchange Commission) has introduced significant changes with the aim of 
promoting transparency among quoted firms (see the Olivencia Report, 1998; the Aldama 
Report, 2003; and the Code of Good Governance, also known as the Conthe Code, 2006). 
These advances have increased the information that quoted firms provide about their 
governance. Fourth, Spain has an index of corporate reputation comparable to other 
measurements analyzed in previous research. Finally, as Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-
Aguiar (2009) have indicated, these characteristics of firms’ ownership structure in Spain 
and the weakness of its corporate control market imply that the conclusions drawn from our 
study can be extended to other civil law countries with similar governance characteristics.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain how ownership 
structure conditions expropriation in the firm and how stakeholders’ perceptions of that 
structure build their expectations about the firm’s capacity to meet their interests. Then, we 
develop hypotheses relating ownership structure to corporate reputation, in the sense that 
characteristics that generate expectations of a higher expropriation reduce corporate 
reputation, while those which limit expropriation enhance corporate reputation. Our third 
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section describes the sample, variables, and methods; our fourth reports the results. We 
conclude by discussing how our findings relate to those of others, the limitations of our 
study, and potential directions for future research. 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPECTATIONS OF EXPROPRIATION, AND 
CORPORATE REPUTATION 
In recent decades, academic research has emphasized the consequences of a firm’s 
ownership structure (e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The ownership structure of 
a firm defines the combination of residual claims and decision control which has 
consequences on firm behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These consequences of 
ownership structure are conditioned by the legal and institutional setting of the country in 
which the firm operates (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2002). Firms in common law countries are characterized by a dispersed ownership 
structure so that the manager-shareholder relationship is the main source of conflicts. In 
civil law countries, as is the case in Spain, large shareholders are more common and can 
use their voting power to extract private benefits (expropriate). This expropriation may take 
a variety of forms, such as diversion of corporate opportunities from a firm by its 
controlling shareholders, transfer pricing favoring the controlling shareholder at non-market 
prices, loan guarantees using the firm’s assets as collateral, and so on (La Porta et al., 
2000). These behaviors by controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders 
(Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000) and the rest of the stakeholders in 
a firm (Clarkson, 1995; John & Senbet, 1998; Shleifer & Summers, 1989; Shleifer & 
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Vishny, 1997) because expropriated resources benefit controlling stakeholders at the 
expense of others (Clarkson, 1995; John & Senbet, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
If stakeholders perceive that ownership structure affects expropriation, they will 
take into account the ownership characteristics of a firm to generate their expectations 
about the firm’s possibilities of satisfying their interests. That is, ownership structure will 
affect corporate reputation. Some research, although limited, has already shown that some 
characteristics of the ownership structures of firms are used as signals that influence 
corporate reputation. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) found that institutional ownership 
enhanced corporate reputation for firms listed in the Fortune survey of America’s Most 
Admired Companies (AMAC).2 Brammer and Millington (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006) found that corporate reputation was positively associated with the extent of long-
term institutional ownership for a sample of UK firms. But it seems reasonable to ask how 
this evidence applies in a civil law country, where not only institutional investors but also 
other types of large shareholders influence corporate behavior. Other characteristics of 
ownership structure, such as insider ownership or ownership concentration in the hands of 
the largest shareholder, may also influence corporate reputation. Additionally, since 
institutional investors are a heterogeneous group with different behaviors (e.g., 
Borokhovich et al., 2006; Brickley et al., 1988; Kochhar & David, 1996; Ruiz-Mallorqui & 
Santana-Martín, 2009), they should have differentiated effects on corporate reputation. 
One essential characteristic of ownership structure that stakeholders can perceive is 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder. Such ownership 
concentration can generate diverse expectations. For firms with dispersed equity ownership, 
stakeholders will anticipate low incentives for the shareholders to monitor managerial 
actions (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997; Fama & Jensen, 1983), and as a result, will 
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 9 
expect expropriation by managers. This expropriation by managers can take a variety of 
forms, such as selling the firm’s outputs or assets to another firm they own at below-market 
prices, just taking cash out of the company, or entrenching themselves in the job even if 
they are no longer competent to run the firm (La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). This expropriation leads to inferior outcomes that reduce the possibilities of 
satisfying stakeholder’s interest. For example, if this expropriation happens, employees, 
customers, or suppliers will not see their interests of continued employment, service, or 
supply guaranteed. So, expectations of expropriation by managers will lead to expectations 
of lower chances that the firm will meet every stakeholder’s interests. When shareholding is 
more concentrated, stakeholders may perceive that it is relatively easy for large owners to 
monitor managers, lessening their vulnerability to expropriation by managers (Gedajlovic 
& Shapiro, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). But above certain levels of ownership 
concentration, stakeholders may perceive that controlling blockholders can also expropriate 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999) and the rest of the stakeholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).  
Drawing on these arguments, we hypothesize a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder and corporate reputation; at 
low levels of ownership concentration, increases in ownership concentration favor 
monitoring to reduce expropriation by managers (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Miguel et 
al., 2004). This favors expectations of fulfillment of stakeholders’ interests that will 
consolidate corporate reputation. However, past a certain point of ownership concentration, 
increases in ownership concentration may give large shareholders the power to expropriate. 
This increases expectations that some stakeholders’ interests may go unfulfilled and, 
therefore, will erode corporate reputation.  
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Hypothesis 1: Ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder is 
positively related to corporate reputation at low levels of ownership, and negatively 
related at high levels.  
Substantial blockholding in the hands of a second large shareholder, which is 
frequent in Continental European countries, Spain among them (Crespi-Caldera & García-
Cestona, 2001; Laeven & Levine, 2008), can also generate expectations among 
stakeholders. Stakeholders can perceive that a second large shareholder may not only avoid 
the agency problem caused by separation of ownership and control traditionally argued by 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), or Fama and Jensen (1983), but may 
also reduce the largest shareholder’s ability to control the firm alone, which will reduce 
expropriation (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch & Hege, 2001; Edwards & 
Weichenrieder, 2004; Gomes & Novaes, 2005; López de Foronda et al., 2007; Maury & 
Pajuste, 2005). The second largest shareholder cannot itself expropriate, because the 
possibilities of expropriation are controlled by the largest shareholder. Thus the second 
largest shareholder has incentives to monitor both managers and the largest shareholder. 
The incentives of monitoring should increase with ownership concentration of the second 
largest shareholder. Therefore, we expect that ownership concentration in the hands of a 
second large shareholder will favor stakeholders’ expectations of low expropriation and of 
future fulfillment of their interests, thus consolidating corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 2a: Ownership concentration in the hands of a second largest 
shareholder is positively related to a firm’s corporate reputation. 
The contestability of the largest shareholder’s power depends on the difference in 
holdings between the largest and second-largest blockholders (Laeven & Levine, 2008; 
Maury & Pajuste, 2005). Stakeholders will anticipate lower expropriation in corporations 
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with a low difference between the two largest blockholders, improving corporate 
reputation. Where the difference is high, stakeholders can expect the largest shareholder’s 
power to be less contestable. This reduces stakeholders’ expectations of having their 
interest fulfilled and impairs corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 2b: The lower the difference between the first and second largest 
blockholdings, the higher the corporate reputation. 
Insider ownership – i.e., ownership in the hands of executive and ex-executive 
directors – can also generate diverse expectations. Stakeholders may perceive that insider 
ownership serves as an alignment of interests in the case of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), which can generate expectations of lower expropriation and therefore enhance 
corporate reputation. However, high stock ownership on the part of insiders can also signal 
their entrenchment, which prevents supervision by other stakeholders and favors 
expropriation (Fernández, Gómez, & Fernández, 1998; McConnell, Servaes, & Lins, 2008; 
Miguel et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1988). If this effect is perceived by stakeholders, high 
levels of ownership concentration in the hands of insiders will erode corporate reputation. 
These theoretical arguments suggest a non-linear relationship between insider ownership 
and corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 3: Insider ownership is positively related to corporate reputation at low 
levels of ownership, and negatively related at high levels.  
Another essential and visible characteristic for stakeholders is the nature of the 
largest shareholder. The distinction of the largest shareholder is relevant since the 
monitoring activities can vary with their experience and incentives (Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Galve & Salas, 1993; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Tribó et al., 2007). Thus, the 
nature of the largest shareholder conditions its role in value distribution (Dyer & Whetten, 
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2006; Graves, 1988; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), the expectations of stakeholders about 
future value distribution, and, therefore, corporate reputation. The findings of Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990), Brammer and Millington (2005), and Brammer and Pavelin (2006), 
described above, suggest that the presence of an institutional investor as the largest 
shareholder is a signal that can favor the building of corporate reputation. However, several 
researchers have stressed the importance of distinguishing the type of institutional investor 
(e.g., Bhattacharya & Graham, 2007; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Brickley et al., 1988; 
Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, & Tehranian, 2007; Kochhar & David, 1996; Ruiz-Mallorqui & 
Santana-Martín, 2009). In general, they distinguish between pressure-sensitive and 
pressure-resistant institutional investors. Pressure-sensitive institutional investors – e.g., 
banks – are institutional investors that are likely to have business relationships with firms in 
which they own an equity stake. Stakeholders can perceive that the double role of creditor 
and shareholder gives banks more information than other types of shareholders, making 
them more efficient monitors (Gorton & Schmid, 2000; Ingley & van der Walt, 2004; 
Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Zoido, 1998). On the other hand, 
they may also expect that conflicts of interest with the rest of the stakeholders may also 
arise. In fact, one of the reasons for banks to be shareholders is the induced business 
relationships with the firms in which they invest (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Aguiar, 2009). 
Furthermore, banks can use their superior information and control in their own interest – 
for instance, by charging above-market interest, capturing all the firm’s banking activities, 
or discouraging risky strategies (Morck, Nakamura, & Shivdasani, 2000; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Zoido, 1998). In contrast, pressure-resistant institutional investors – e.g., 
investment and pension funds – have no potential business links with the firms in which 
they invest, and they bear the cost associated with declines in value creation (Bhattacharya 
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& Graham, 2007; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Brickley et al., 1988). Thus stakeholders 
should perceive them only as efficient monitors.3 
Other types of largest shareholder can also generate expectations. Stakeholders may 
perceive that a largest shareholder who is an individual or a family will likely be a founder 
or a founder’s family successor and will therefore have an emotional involvement in the 
firm (Galve & Salas, 2003). Such personal involvement may generate positive expectations, 
since the family shareholder will be more strongly interested in controlling expropriation 
than other types of shareholders for which the firm is only a piece in their portfolios 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; McConaughy, Mathews, & Fialko, 
2001). However, family members have special ties and may ignore the interests of non-
family stakeholders (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Jara-Bertín, López-Iturriaga, & López-de-
Foronda, 2008), who can perceive that family members can tailor value distribution to the 
objectives of the family (Gómez-Mejia, Núñez Nickel, & Gutiérrez, 2001; Morck & Yeung, 
2004; Shleifer & Summers, 1989). Thus, we expect a negative relationship between 
individual or family ownership and corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 4a: Pressure-sensitive institutional investors are negatively related to 
corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Pressure-resistant institutional investors are positively related to 
corporate reputation. 
Hypothesis 4c: Individual or family ownership is negatively related to corporate 
reputation. 
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SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The hypotheses were tested on firms included in the MERCO – Monitor Español de 
Reputación COrporativa (Spanish Monitor of Corporate Reputation) – ranking of the 100 
top reputed firms in Spain for 2000–2007. The ranking is explained below. This index 
provides data for eight years, so we were able to use a panel data analysis and thus avoid 
the problems of unobservable heterogeneity in empirical analyses, and also compare our 
findings to those obtained by previous researchers. The initial sample comprised those 
firms included in the MERCO ranking for each of the years considered. From the initial 
sample we excluded firms for which information on ownership structure or board 
characteristics was not available. The final sample consists of a panel comprising 59 firms 
for an eight-year period. The panel is unbalanced since not all firms are included in the 
MERCO ranking for the full eight-year period (see table 1). The total number of 
observations is 361.  
 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Methodology 
Since the dependent variable analyzed –corporate reputation- may present inertia in 
time –i.e., present values of corporate reputation may be conditioned by previous values-, 
we used a dynamic panel data analysis. The estimation approach used is Arellano and 
Bover’s (1995) and Blundell and Bond’s (1998) “System GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments).” The system GMM estimator has a number of advantages. On the one hand, it 
controls for the possible problems of endogeneity of explanatory variables and, on the 
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other, it avoids non-observable constant heterogeneity arising out of the specific features of 
each firm that remain over time. Additionally, this estimation approach allows the 
introduction of more instruments than other GMM estimators, which improves efficiency. 
The validity of GMM estimates depends on the absence of second-order serial 
autocorrelation in the residuals and on the validity of the instruments analyzed – note that 
first-order serial correlations are significant by way of construction. For this reason, Table 3 
reports a second-order serial correlation test and a Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions that checks the validity of the selected instruments. These conditions are met in 
all of our analyses. Finally, to avoid overfitting biases and weak Hansen tests derived from 
the use of numerous instruments, we reduced the lags available for instruments and we 
collapsed the instruments (Roodman. 2009). 
Variables 
Corporate Reputation. Corporate reputation information was obtained from the 
MERCO ranking. This index provides a score for the 100 best reputed companies in Spain 
and has been employed in previous research (Fernández & Luna, 2007). It is similar to 
Fortune’s AMAC, which is the measure most commonly used in academic journals (e.g., 
Black, Carnes, & Richardson, 2000; Brown, 1997; Chung, Schneeweis, & Eneroth, 2003; 
Cordeiro & Sambharya, 1997; Fombrum & Shanley, 1990; Hammond & Slocum, 1996; 
Riari-Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1991; Roberts & Dowling, 1997, 2002; Sobol & Farrelly, 1988; 
Srivastava, McInish, Wood & Capraro, 1997; Vergin & Qoronfleh, 1998).4 The survey 
evaluates companies on six dimensions (economic performance, product quality, culture 
and workplace quality, ethics and corporate social responsibility, international and global 
presence, and innovation), each of which is disaggregated into three items. The items 
considered are shown in the Appendix. The ranking is built in two stages.5 First, the survey 
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asks for the perceptions of major Spanish managers. In 2008, the survey was mailed to 
12,800 Spanish top managers of the 3,000 firms with revenue higher than 50 million euros. 
The final 2008 sample comprised 1,215 questionnaire responses. This stage provisionally 
proposes the 100 most reputable Spanish firms. Second, each of these firms is evaluated by 
several raters: financial analysts, NGOs, managers, unions, and consumer associations. 
These ratings are verified through research into the firms’ own reports and through a “merit 
questionnaire” created by MERCO analysts. Finally, the definitive ranking is drawn up and 
released. 
In order to influence corporate reputation, information on ownership structure has to 
be perceived and interpreted by the firm’s different audiences, who then form expectations 
about expropriation. Therefore, we analyzed the effect of ownership structure on corporate 
reputation as measured after the publication of information on the firms’ ownership 
structure. We used the latest publicly available information on ownership structure for each 
of the years analyzed, because we assume that stakeholders will base their expectations on 
the most up-to-date available information. 
Ownership Structure. The main sources of information for the independent 
variables were the databases from the CNMV (Spanish Stock Exchange Commission), the 
DICODI database for the top 50,000 Spanish companies, Who’s Who in Spain, Thomson 
ONE Banker, and firms’ financial statements. More specifically, we used data from the 
database of “Significant shares for all quoted companies,” and corporate governance reports 
for the period 2000–2007, and firms’ financial statements, DICODI, and Who’s Who in 
Spain databases for the period 1995–2007. 
Ownership concentration was measured by the percentages of shares controlled by 
the largest and second largest shareholders. In our calculations we considered direct as well 
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as indirect ownership, but not full pyramidal ownership, since only direct and indirect 
ownership are easy for stakeholders to obtain and perceive. Additionally, when several 
members of a family had stockholdings, we considered them as a single shareholder since 
we believe stakeholders will perceive that family members share interests. To account for 
the contestability of the largest shareholder's power, we used a third variable measuring the 
relative comparison of the first and second largest shareholdings. This was calculated as the 
difference between the first and second largest shareholdings divided by the largest 
shareholding. We used this relative comparison instead of the absolute difference between 
the first and second largest shareholder because the capability of the second shareholder to 
control the main one depends not only on the difference, but also on the level of ownership 
of each shareholder. For instance, the power of the second shareholder is not the same 
when the main shareholder holds a 24% stake and the second 20% as it is when the first 
holds 5% and the second 1%. Insider ownership was proxied by the percentage of stock 
controlled by executive and ex-executive directors.6 In order to test for non-linear effects in 
the relationships analyzed, we used the square for ownership concentration of the largest 
shareholder and the square for insider ownership (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Miguel et 
al., 2004). Finally, in order to capture the type of the largest shareholder we used four 
dummy variables, which identify the largest shareholder as a family or individual, a 
pressure-sensitive institutional investor (financial institutions), a pressure-resistant 
institutional investor (investment and pension funds), or “other.” Our typology is similar to 
those employed by previous researchers (Galve & Salas, 1993; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Tribó et al., 2007). In calculating all the variables we 
considered voting shares; non-voting shares are very rare in Spanish quoted firms, so using 
all types of shares should not change the results of our analyses. 
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Control Variables. Since other corporate governance mechanisms such as the 
board of directors can also affect stakeholders’ expectations (Brammer, Millington, & 
Pavelin, 2009), we included as control variables three characteristics of the board of 
directors that can be perceived by stakeholders: board size, measured as the natural log of 
the number of directors; composition, measured as the proportion of independent directors 
and proportion of insider directors; and CEO duality. Research considering the influence of 
board size on its effectiveness has developed contradictory arguments. On the one hand, 
researchers argue that larger boards have more knowledge and skills at their disposal 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1992), have greater ability to monitor 
(Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994), and enable the firm to form larger environmental 
linkages and secure scarce resources (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Pfeffer, 
1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). On the other hand, researchers have also argued that 
oversized boards have problems of poorer communication and decision-making, and are 
easier for the CEO to control (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). 
Stakeholders may perceive both effects, so the sign of the relationship between board size 
and corporate reputation is an open question. Board composition, and especially the 
presence of independent directors, has also been considered a relevant determinant of 
effectiveness. A greater proportion of independent directors should generate a perception of 
more effective control of managerial actions and an orientation towards the fulfillment of 
every stakeholder’s interest, which should favor corporate reputation (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Freeman, 1984; Johnson & Greening, 
1999; Pfeffer & Salanzik, 1978; Zahra, 1989). In contrast, insider directors, being managers 
and directors at the same time, should be less able to monitor (Dalton et al., 1998; Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991) and less oriented towards other stakeholders, which should negatively 
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affect corporate reputation.7 Finally, although empirical evidence has not been conclusive 
(see meta-analysis and review by Dalton et al., 1998 and Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005), agency 
theorists have traditionally argued that CEO duality should produce CEO entrenchment by 
reducing board monitoring effectiveness (Dalton et al., 1998; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Expectations of CEO entrenchment should negatively affect 
corporate reputation. The information regarding these board characteristics was obtained 
from the Spencer Stuart Board Index published by Spencer Stuart Consulting, firms’ 
corporate governance reports, and firms’ financial statements.  
Three additional variables were used as controls, since they have frequently been 
related to corporate reputation in empirical research: firm size, age, and return on equity. 
We also controlled for industry and year. Firm size was measured by the log of total assets. 
There is ample empirical evidence that larger firms have better corporate reputations 
(Cordeiro & Sambharya, 1997; Deephouse, 1997; Dunbar & Schwalbach, 2000; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Riahi-Belkaoui & Pavlik, 1991; Roberts & Dowling, 1997; Sobol & 
Farrelly, 1988). Large firms, being more visible in markets, are expected to be more closely 
examined by the different audiences and, therefore, to exhibit low expropriation that favors 
the building of corporate reputation. Smaller companies, which may even go unnoticed in 
the market, are expected to be less controlled and therefore less careful in the distribution of 
firm value, reducing corporate reputation.  
Although the empirical literature shows ambiguous findings about the influence of 
firm age on corporate reputation (Rao, 1994; Schultz, Mouritsen, & Gabrielsen, 2001), we 
have introduced firm age because corporate reputation accumulates slowly (Fombrun, 
1996; Schultz et al., 2001). Companies that have remained in business through long periods 
of market supervision can be expected to have maintained their stakeholders’ satisfaction, 
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so that stakeholders extrapolate8 from previous behaviors to generate expectations of future 
behavior (Weizsacker, 1980, cited by Williamson, 1985). 
Our third variable is Return on Equity (ROE). Previous research has frequently 
analyzed the influence of returns on corporate reputation (Dunbar & Schwalbach, 2000; 
Inglis, Morley, & Sammut, 2006; McGuire, Schneeweis, & Branch, 1990; Rose & 
Thomsen, 2004). The possibilities of satisfying future demands of stakeholders are higher 
when the value created by the firm is higher and when expropriation is lower. Stakeholders 
will use previous firm performance to estimate future performance, and a higher expected 
value creation will lead them to expect satisfaction of their interests and thus will build 
corporate reputation. 
Finally, we also controlled for industry and year by introducing temporal and 
industry dummies. To calculate industry dummies we used the CNAE (Spanish Code of 
Business Activities), which largely corresponds with standard SIC codes.  
Sample selection bias 
As indicated above due to the MERCO coverage of the 100 most reputable firms in 
Spain, there is a drop of observations in our sample. Therefore, we tested and corrected for 
sample selection bias following the procedure indicated by Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2007, 2010) and El Lahga and Moreau (2007). This procedure is similar to that proposed 
by Heckman (1979). It consists in obtaining a probit estimation for each time period in 
which the dependent is a dummy variable gauging whether or not the firm is included in the 
MERCO index of the top reputed companies. The explanatory variables were ownership 
concentration in the hands of the main shareholder and second shareholder, insider 
ownership, the percentage of independent directors, firm size, age, and ROE. Due to 
methodological requirements, leverage and the percentage of directors who are shareholder 
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representatives were also added as exclusion restriction variables: variables that are 
included in the probit estimations but not in the GMM models analyzed. These estimates 
are used to compute the inverse Mill’s ratios for each probit regression. For the selected 
sample we then estimated each equation augmented by the inverse Mills ratios calculated 
for each time period. A test of selection bias is the t-test of the significance of the 
coefficient for the inverse Mills ratios. T-tests for the inverse Mill’s ratio showed 
significant coefficients for only 6 of the 15 models considered in our study. Additionally, 
the coefficients and significance levels of our hypothesized variables in the analyses 
remained almost identical after we included the inverse Mill’s ratio, indicating that sample 
selection bias is not a concern in our study. We report results only for the models that test 
and correct for sample selection. Results for the uncorrected models and for probit models 
can be obtained from the authors. 
The following model is used to test the effect of ownership structure on corporate 
reputation: 
Corporate Reputationit= 
α + β1(corporate reputationit-1) 
+ β2(ownership concentration largest shareholderit) 
+ β3(ownership concentration largest shareholder squaredit) 
+ β4(ownership concentration second largest shareholderit) 
+ β5(relative difference in ownership concentration between first and second largest 
shareholdersit) 
+ β6(insider ownershipit) 
+ β7(insider ownership squaredit) 
+ β8(family or individualit) 
+ β9(pressure-sensitive institutional investorit) 
+ β10(pressure-resistant institutional investorit) 
+ β11(otherit) 
+ β12(board sizeit) 
+ β13(percentage of independent directorsit) 
+ β14(percentage of inside directorsit) 
+ β15(CEO dualityit) 
+ β16(sizeit) 
+ β17(ageit) 
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+ β18(ROEit) 
+ β19(inverse Mills Ratioit) 
+dt+di+εit 
where i equals each individual, t equals time, and εit is the random error for each 
observation. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for all 
independent and dependent variables. These descriptive statistics for our sample show 
characteristics of a typical civil law country with high levels of ownership concentration in 
the hands of the largest shareholder (average = 24.3 percent). Ownership in the hands of the 
second largest shareholder is on average also high, but represents only a third of the 
average ownership by the largest shareholder (average = 7.6 percent). The descriptive 
statistics also show similar proportions of the different types of largest shareholder: family 
or individual, pressure-sensitive institutional, and pressure-resistant institutional investors. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The results of panel data analyses are shown in Table 3. Models 1 to 7 show partial 
estimations. Models 1 and 2 test the linear and quadratic relationships related to ownership 
concentration for the largest shareholder. Models 3 and 4 analyze the role of the second 
largest shareholder, and this second largest shareholder’s power to contest the first one, 
respectively. Models 5 and 6 test the linear and quadratic relationships between insider 
ownership and corporate reputation, and model 7 tests the influence of the type of the 
largest shareholder. Full panel data analyses, in which we consider linear and non-linear 
relationships, are provided in models 8 to 15. Since the contestability variable was 
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calculated by the difference in ownership concentration between the main and second 
largest shareholders relative to the largest shareholding – i.e., a linear combination of both 
variables – we had to analyze this variable in separate models (12 to 15). Results for 
models in which each independent variable is analyzed individually and for full models are 
almost the same; therefore, we discuss them together.  
Results for models 1, 8, and 10, which consider linear relationships, show a negative 
and significant coefficient for the first-owner concentration variable (t = -1.76, p<0.10; t = -
3.08, p<0.01; and t = -3.76, p<0.001, respectively). Models 2, 9, and 11 test a non-linear 
relationship. The results show a negative and significant coefficient for the squared version 
of this variable only in model 2 (t = -2.30, p<0.05). These results do not support hypothesis 
1, which indicates a quadratic relationship. They show instead a negative and linear 
relationship, which suggests that ownership concentration in the hands of the main 
shareholder harms corporate reputation.  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The results show a non-significant relationship between second-owner concentration 
and corporate reputation in all the models (3, 8, 9, 10, and 11). However, they also show a 
negative and significant coefficient for the contestability variable (t = -2.53, p<0.05; t = -
2.10, p<0.05; t = -3.29, p<0.01; and t = -2.00, p<0.05 in models 12 to 15, respectively). 
These findings support hypothesis 2b: the lower the difference between the first and second 
largest blockholdings, the greater the corporate reputation. 
Models 5, 8, 10, 12, and 14 test a linear relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate reputation. Results show negative and significant coefficients for insider 
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ownership in all of the models except model 5 (t = -2.93, p<0.01; t = -2.35, p<0.05; t = -
5.01, p<0.001; and t = -6.15, p<0.001, for models 8, 10, 12, and 14, respectively). Models 
6, 9, 11, 13, and 15 test a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and corporate 
reputation. The results show positive and significant coefficients for ownership 
concentration in the hands of insiders (t = 2.79, p<0.01; t = 3.07, p<0.01; t = 1.74, p<0.10; t 
= 2.72, p<0.01; and t = 2.61, p<0.05, for models 6, 9, 11, 13, and 15 respectively) and 
negative and significant coefficients for the squared variable (t = -2.92, p<0.01; t = -3.20, 
p<0.01; t = -1.92, p<0.10; t = -3.02, p<0.01; and t = -2.86, p<0.01 for models 6, 9, 11, 13, 
and 15 respectively). These results support hypothesis 3, which suggests a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and corporate reputation; insider ownership is 
positively related to corporate reputation at low levels of ownership and negatively related 
at high levels. 
Finally, models 7, 10, 11, 14, and 15 show the relationship between the type of the 
largest shareholder and corporate reputation. For these analyses we used dummy variables, 
so we had to exclude one type of shareholder to avoid a problem of multicollinearity. We 
excluded “other” firms, which became the comparison group. The results show negative 
and significant coefficients for pressure-resistant institutional owners (t = -3.39, p<0.001; t 
= -2.76, p<0.01; t = -2.09, p<0.05; t = -1.90, p<0.10; and t = -4.43, p<0.001) in all analyses 
(models 7, 10, 11, 14, and 15 respectively), and a negative and significant coefficient for 
pressure-sensitive owners (t = -2.63, p<0.05; t = -2.12, p<0.05; t = -2.20, p<0.05, and t = -
2.12, p<0.05) in models 7, 10, 11, and 15 respectively. Family or individual ownership 
shows a positive and significant coefficient only in model 14 (t = 1.85, p<0.10). These 
results show that, compared to the comparison group, both pressure-resistant and pressure-
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sensitive institutional investors impair corporate reputation, whereas family or individual 
ownership does not seem to affect corporate reputation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our research has analyzed the influence of ownership structure on a firm’s 
reputation. Our results, for a sample of the most reputable firms in Spain, show that 
stakeholders consider characteristics of ownership structure when generating the 
expectations of future expropriation that lead to corporate reputation. Specifically, our 
results support the idea that high levels of ownership concentration in the hands of the 
largest shareholder erode corporate reputation. The lack of significance of the non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration by the largest shareholder and corporate 
reputation may be due to the high levels of ownership concentration in Spanish firms. 
These high levels of ownership concentration may not allow stakeholders to perceive any 
positive influences that might arise for lower levels of ownership. Our results also show a 
significant relationship between the contestability of the largest shareholder's power and 
corporate reputation: the lower the difference between the first and second largest 
blockholdings, the larger the perception of monitoring, which generates expectations of 
lower expropriation and finally fosters corporate reputation. Additionally, corporate 
reputation is positively related to insider ownership at low levels of ownership, and 
negatively related at high levels. Our analyses show that the presence of either pressure-
resistant or pressure-sensitive institutional investors erodes corporate reputation. This 
finding is not consistent with research by Fombrun and Shanley (1990), Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006), and Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2004), which has shown a positive 
effect of institutional ownership on corporate reputation; nor is it consistent with arguments 
that pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors behave differently (e.g., 
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Brickley et al., 1988; Kochhar & David, 1996). Our result suggests that stakeholders in 
Spain, rather than perceiving institutional investors as active monitors of firm behavior, 
perceive them as traders concerned with short-term investment horizons (Bushee, 2001; 
Graves and Waddock, 1990; Laverty, 1996). In Spain, institutional investors usually 
maintain less stable investments than other types of largest shareholders, and thus may be 
perceived as focusing on short-term performance at the expense of long-run value. This 
perception implies an expectation of expropriation of rents that erodes corporate reputation. 
Finally, family or individual ownership does not show a significant influence on corporate 
reputation. This finding suggests that the possible benefits of family ownership may 
counterbalance the negative effects, so that stakeholders do not have clear expectations 
concerning this type of shareholder. 
Our findings suggest that stakeholders have more complex perceptions about 
ownership concentration of insiders than about ownership concentration of the largest 
blockholder. This result may seem especially surprising considering that firms in a typical 
civil law country like Spain traditionally have large shareholders. These perceptions may 
exist because corporate governance codes and the media, even in civil law countries, have 
traditionally placed more emphasis on managerial opportunism than on controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation. This implication of our results suggests that stakeholders’ 
expectations are influenced by the environmental context – e.g., the media and legal 
regulation.  
Our findings with regard to control variables suggest that independent directors, 
board size, and CEO duality are related to corporate reputation. Our findings are consistent 
with arguments that board independence improves corporate governance (CNMV, 2006; 
OECD, 2004; Randoy & Jennsen, 2004) and suggest that those boards with a greater 
Page 26 of 48
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 27 
proportion of independent directors signal more effective control that discourages 
managerial or majority owner’s expropriation, and an orientation towards fulfillment of 
every stakeholders’ interest, which will favor corporate reputation (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Freeman, 1984; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Zahra, 
1989). Our finding is also consistent with arguments by Pfeffer & Salanzic (1978) that 
outside directors may enhance the reputation and credibility of an organization and 
contribute to its legitimacy. The positive and significant influence of board size on 
corporate reputation also suggests that stakeholders perceive larger boards to have more 
knowledge and skills at their disposal (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Pearce & Zahra, 1992), to 
favor supervision of managerial actions (Goodstein et al., 1994) or to provide the firm with 
larger environmental linkages and secure scarce resources (Dalton et al., 1999; Goodstein et 
al., 1994; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These effects foster expectation of 
firms’ value creation and at the same time of reduced expropriation, finally leading to 
building corporate reputation. Finally, our findings also show that CEO duality is 
negatively related to corporate reputation. This finding is consistent with previous 
arguments that CEO duality should produce CEO entrenchment by reducing board 
monitoring effectiveness (Dalton et al., 1998; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). Expectations of CEO entrenchment negatively affect corporate reputation. 
In sum, our paper makes three major contributions. First, we provide evidence of 
the impact of ownership structure on an outcome variable – corporate reputation – that has 
scarcely been analyzed before. Researchers have focused mainly on the role of ownership 
structure as a mechanism of corporate governance (e.g., Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Gedajlovic 
& Shapiro, 1998; Miguel, et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1988), but our findings show that the 
characteristics of ownership structure are also signals, which will translate into 
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stakeholders’ responses towards the firm. Second, we also contribute to the limited research 
on the factors that favor corporate reputation. Previous research analyzing the influence of 
ownership structure on corporate reputation has focused only on common law countries. 
The “law and finance” approach has stressed differences both in levels of ownership 
concentration and in quality of law enforcement and accounting standards which lead to 
differences in the effects of ownership structures between civil law countries and common 
law countries (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002; López de Foronda et al., 
2007). Specifically, in contrast to civil law countries, common law ones tend to protect 
investors better, which leads to more concentrated ownership in the case of civil law 
countries. However, as a consequence, controlling shareholders have the power to 
expropriate (La Porta et al., 2002), which is also favored by this lower protection. This 
difference in levels and effects of ownership concentration may also have different effects 
on stakeholders’ perceptions and expectations. Lastly, our paper complements previous 
research analyzing how pressure-resistant vs. pressure-sensitive institutional investors have 
different influences in the firm (e.g., Borokhovich et al., 2006; Brickley et al., 1988; 
Kochhar & David, 1996). Our paper suggests that stakeholders in Spain have similar 
perceptions of pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional investors. 
One limitation of our study involves the structure of the sample. The MERCO 
index, like other indexes of corporate reputation, publishes scores only for the best reputed 
firms. Therefore our analyses refer to the influence of visible characteristics of ownership 
structure on differences among the most reputable firms, but not between reputed and non-
reputed ones. This analysis should be an interesting future line of research. Additionally, in 
our research we employed the latest publicly available information on ownership structure 
for each of the years analyzed, on the assumption that stakeholders will use the most up-to-
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date information available, and since large blockholdings are relatively stable over time, 
our assumption should not seriously bias our findings. Third, our measure of insider 
ownership considers only the percentage of stock controlled by executive and ex-executive 
directors. A more complete definition of insider ownership would consider stock controlled 
by all executives, but this information was not publicly available. Nevertheless, we believe 
our definition does include those executives with the largest shareholdings, and thus the 
most influential ones when forming expectations about a firm’s future behavior. Fourth, in 
the analyses presented in the paper we have not considered the role of large shareholders’ 
representatives on the board of directors, because of problems of collinearity. We 
performed additional analyses replacing the proportion of independent directors with the 
proportion of large shareholders’ representatives on the board, and results for these 
analyses reinforce our conclusions: the proportion of large shareholders’ representatives 
showed a negative relationship with corporate reputation. Results of these analyses can be 
obtained from the authors. Finally, our research focuses on a single civil law country, 
Spain; new analyses on other civil law countries should be an interesting future line of 
research.  
Nevertheless, the study has a number of implications. Our chief conclusion, that 
corporate ownership structures influence corporate reputation, suggests that the well-
documented influence of ownership structure on financial performance results not only 
directly from expropriation. Previous research has found that corporate reputation improves 
financial performance (e.g., Black et al., 2000; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). If we link this 
evidence to our results, we can consider that part of the widely analyzed relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance may be due to the effect of ownership 
structure on corporate reputation. In this sense, we can state that ownership structure is not 
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only a corporate governance mechanism that conditions actual expropriation, but also a 
signal that generates expectations about expropriation – expectations that favor or erode 
corporate reputation. 
Furthermore, we think that ownership structure can also affect the accumulation of 
other capabilities and resources – e.g., culture, knowledge, or innovation – in which 
stakeholders’ attitudes, such as perception or effort, matter. Stakeholders take into account 
their expectations about value distribution and behave in a way that favors their best 
interests (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & 
Schminke, 2001). A change in the perceived characteristics of ownership structure (i.e., a 
change in the largest shareholder or an increase or decrease in the stock ownership of the 
largest shareholder or of insiders) may signal a different future distribution of value, 
changing the behavior of stakeholders, who seek to optimize their assignment in value 
distribution. These new behaviors will change the existing resource structure. Examining 
the influence of ownership structure on other resources would be a promising extension of 
our research. It would also be of interest to analyze the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate reputation in other countries. Theoretical and empirical research on 
ownership structure has highlighted that differing institutional contexts affect the 
ownership structures of firms (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998, 1999); these contexts might 
produce relationships different from those shown in our research. In particular, the “law 
and finance” approach (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) suggests that new studies in a common 
law country might point to different effects of ownership structure on corporate reputation. 
Finally, corporate reputation is commonly defined by the aggregate expectations of every 
group of stakeholders; but it would be interesting to disaggregate how each group of 
Page 30 of 48
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Review Copy
 31 
stakeholders perceives ownership structure in order to generate expectations that lead to 
corporate reputation.  
For practitioners, our findings suggest how managers and directors in civil law 
countries should communicate and manage ownership structure and board of director’s 
characteristics to consolidate corporate reputation. On the one hand, corporate 
communications should emphasize any existing characteristics of ownership structure and 
of the board of directors that favor reputation, such as low levels of ownership 
concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder and low differences in ownership 
concentration between the first and second largest shareholders. On the other hand, 
directors and even large shareholders should try to change those characteristics of the board 
of directors that may generate negative perceptions – for instance, the nominations 
committee of the board of directors might suggest an increase in board size or in the 
number of independent directors, or the avoidance of CEO duality. When characteristics are 
difficult, even impossible, to change – e.g., high levels of ownership concentration in the 
hands of the largest shareholder, or high or low levels of insider ownership concentration – 
managers and directors should introduce compensatory mechanisms such as codes of 
conduct and communicate these mechanisms to stakeholders. Finally, our findings are also 
of interest for regulators, who should consider our findings that independent directors 
improve corporate reputation, and that directors who represent large shareholders impair it.  
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NOTES 
[1] According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, 2000), the commercial 
legal systems of most countries derive from a few legal families including the English (common 
law) system and the French, Spanish, and German ones (civil law systems, all derived from 
Roman law). These different legal systems generate significant differences among countries in the 
quality of law enforcement and accounting standards. Common law countries seem to protect 
investors better than civil law ones; as a result, there are also large differences among countries in 
ownership concentration in publicly traded firms and in the access of these firms to external 
finance. Firms in civil law countries with lower investor protection may need more concentrated 
ownership in order to avoid managerial expropriation. However, as a consequence these 
controlling shareholders have an active role in organizational behavior and the power to 
expropriate (La Porta et al., 2002).  
[2] Since 1983, Fortune’s AMAC has annually surveyed CEOs’ and analysts’ views of the 10-15 largest 
companies on a 64 industry list. Respondents are asked to rate a competitor’s reputation on a 10-point 
scale (0=poor and 10=excellent) in terms of eight key attributes of reputation: (1) Financial soundness; 
(2) Long-term investment value; (3) Use of corporate assets; (4) Innovativeness; (5) Quality of the 
company’s management; (6) Quality of its products and services; (7) Ability to attract, develop and 
keep talented people; and (8) Acknowledgement of social responsibility (Chun, 2005). 
[3] Scholars including Brickley and colleagues (1988) and Borokovich and colleagues (2006) have 
shown that the type of institutional investors influences the tendency to support managerial 
decisions, but their arguments rest on the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders 
traditional in common law countries. We agree with Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Aguiar (2009) 
that these arguments cannot be completely applied to civil law countries in which the main 
conflict of interest rests in the power of the largest shareholder to expropriate. 
[4] Similar surveys have been developed in various countries. “Asia’s Most Admired Companies,” 
published by Far East Economic Review; “Britain’s Most Admired Companies,” published by 
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Management Today; “Most Respected Companies,” published by Financial Times; Manager 
Magazine’s survey of Germany’s largest manufacturing and service firms and Børsens 
Nyhedsmagasin’s ranking for Denmark have also been used in academic research (Brammer & 
Millington, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Dunbar & Schwalbach, 2000; Schultz et al., 2001). 
[5] A thorough description of the MERCO methodology can be seen at its website: 
http://www.english.merco.info/show/mercoempresas/2004. 
[6] Spanish quoted companies are requested to disclose the number of shares held by directors. 
However, executives who are not members of the board are subject only to ordinary disclosure, 
i.e., if they hold 5% or more of the shares. This legal requirement meant that we had to define 
insider ownership as ownership by executive and ex-executive directors. Although our measure 
does not capture the full ownership of executives, it does capture the stock ownership of the most 
influential insiders, and thus of the ones most important to the formation of expectations about a 
firm’s future behavior. 
[7] In the case of a civil law country like Spain, the presence of large shareholders’ representatives 
on the board may also negatively affect corporate reputation. However, owing to problems of 
collinearity we could not include this variable in our analyses. We performed additional analyses 
replacing the proportion of independent directors with the proportion of large shareholders’ 
representatives on the board, and results for these analyses reinforce our conclusions: the 
proportion of large shareholders’ representatives showed a negative relationship with corporate 
reputation. Results of these analyses can be obtained from the authors. 
[8] Weizsacker (1980:72-73; cited by Williamson, 1985) explains that “people extrapolate the 
behaviour of others from past observations and this extrapolation is self-stabilizing, because it 
provides incentives for others to live up to these expectations [...]. By observing others’ behaviour 
in the past, one can fairly confidently predict their behaviour in the future without incurring 
further cost.” 
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TABLE 1  
Structure of the Sample 
Number of annual 
observations per 
company
Number of 
companies
Number of 
observations
4 16 64
5 10 50
6 4 24
7 9 63
8 20 160
Total 59 361
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Mean St. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Ownership 
concentration first 
shareholder
24.34 23.71
2 Ownership 
concentration second 
shareholder
7.57 7.46 -0.31***
3 Difference between 
first and second 
largest shareholders
0.47 0.34  0.65*** -0.06
4 Insider ownership 8.51 18.70  0.02  0.01  0.06
5 Family or individual 0.28 0.45  0.18***  0.09  0.26***  0.03
6 Pressure-sensitive institutional investor 0.24 0.43 -0.06 -0.07 -0.00  0.06 -0.35***
7 Pressure-resistant 
institutional investor 0.23 0.42 -0.27***  0.13* -0.20*** -0.04 -0.34*** -0.31***
8 Other 0.23 0.42 0.18*** -0.21*** -0.06 -0.15** -0.34*** -0.31*** -0.30***
9 Independent 
directors 0.48 0.25 -0.45***  0.51*** -0.15** -0.05 -0.13* -0.06  0.37*** -0.20***
10 Insider directors 0.18 0.10  0.24*** -0.11*  0.24***  0.09†  0.23***  0.01 -0.04 -0.27* -0.24***
11 Duality 0.72 0.45  0.07 -0.23***  0.04  0.07  0.13**  0.05 -0.09† -0.02 -0.09†  0.29***
12 Board size 2.63 0.28  0.03  0.03 -0.07  0.05 -0.16**  0.22*** -0.12* 0.06 -0.20*** -0.05 -0.19***
13 Size 16.37 1.93 -0.42***  0.56*** -0.25***  0.02 -0.26***  0.04  0.20*** -0.01  0.59*** -0.14** -0.16**  0.15**
14 Age 78.32 48.18 -0.25***  0.50*** -0.08  0.03 -0.19***  0.04  0.10† 0.12*  0.31*** -0.32*** -0.05  0.23***  0.48***
15 ROE 0.11 0.18  0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03  0.03 -0.04  0.16** -0.12*  0.06  0.12*  0.05 -0.11* -0.14** -0.18***
16 Corporate reputation 8.03 0.50 -0.10† -0.07 0.03  0.07 -0.07  0.22*** -0.08 -0.09  0.06  0.12*  0.11*  0.13*  0.20*** -0.08  0.00
 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
N= 361 observations. 
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TABLE 3  
Results of Dynamic Panel Data Analyses of the Influence of Ownership Structure on Corporate Reputation  
Reputation (t-1)  0.58 ***  0.61 ***  0.64 ***  0.66 ***  0.66 ***  0.56 ***  0.64 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Ownership concentration main shareholder -0.01 †  0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
Ownership concentration main shareholder squared -0.00 *
(0.00)
Ownership concentration second shareholder  0.00
(0.01)
Difference in ownership concentration between the main 
and second shareholder -0.14
(0.11)
Insider ownership -0.00  0.01 **
(0.00) (0.00)
Insider ownership squared -0.00 **
(0.00)
Family or individual -0.01
(0.04)
Pressure-sensitive institutional investor -0.11 *
(0.04)
Pressure-resistant institutional investor -0.11 ***
(0.03)
Board size  0.35 †  0.52 ** -0.09  0.28 †  0.05  0.18  '0.11
(0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12)
Independent directors  0.35  0.36 †  0.37 **  0.36 *  0.43 ***  0.38 ***  0.42 ***
(0.22) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Insider directors -0.11  0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.36 -0.45 -0.17
(0.33) (0.34) (0.25) (0.35) (0.25) (0.30) (0.18)
Duality -0.12 * -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 ** -0.15 ** -0.06 †
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Size -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02  0.05 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 † -0.00 * -0.00 -0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROE  0.42 ***  0.55 ***  0.33 **  0.38 **  0.35 ***  0.37 **  0.42 ***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.06 -0.13 * -0.09 -0.11 † -0.14 -0.01 -0.09
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
intercept  2.98 ***  1.87 **  3.07 ***  2.33 ***  2.97 ***  1.99 ***  2.70 ***
(0.56) (0.60) (0.47) (0.55) (0.64) (0.49) (0.46)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
d.f.
AR(1) *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
AR(2)
Hansen
d.f.
Unstandardized coefficients. 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001
(22, 58)(22, 58)
            24.05
          (24)
             -4.32
              0.24
            37.57
          (36)
             -3.53
              0.34
            25.48
         (21)
             -4.42
              0.43
            26.49
         (21)
(22, 58)
             -4.75
              0.29
         (24)
             -4.53
              0.30
            26.71
         (21)
(23, 58)
             -4.74
              0.25
             -4.62
              0.35
            23.53
         (21)
            29.29
            79.32     949410.15           992.01
(24, 58)(22, 58) (23, 58)
          104.17           132.97             80.66             82.74
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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TABLE 3 (continued)  
Results of Dynamic Panel Data Analyses of the Influence of Ownership Structure on Corporate Reputation 
Reputation (t-1)  0.52 ***  0.52 ***  0.46 ***  0.51 ***  0.58 ***  0.59 ***  0.58 ***  0.58 ***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Ownership concentration main shareholder -0.01 ** -0.00 -0.01 *** -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Ownership concentration main shareholder squared -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Ownership concentration second shareholder  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Difference in ownership concentration between the main 
and second shareholder -0.35 * -0.22 * -0.37 ** -0.24 *
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Insider ownership -0.00 **  0.01 ** -0.00 *  0.01 † -0.00 ***  0.01 ** -0.00 ***  0.01 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Insider ownership squared -0.00 ** -0.00 † -0.00 ** -0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Family or individual -0.06 -0.12  0.08 † -0.08
(0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Pressure-sensitive institutional investor -0.12 * -0.16 *  0.00 -0.11 *
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Pressure-resistant institutional investor -0.19 ** -0.19 * -0.11 † -0.25 ***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
Board size  0.42 *  0.75 ***  0.57 ***  0.55 **  0.22  0.35 †  0.38 **  0.33 *
(0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14)
Independent directors  0.24 **  0.31 **  0.22 *  0.25 *  0.25 *  0.24 *  0.35 ***  0.38 ***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Insider directors  0.25  0.23  0.24 -0.04 -0.15 -0.35 -0.43 -0.21
(0.32) (0.36) (0.31) (0.38) (0.43) (0.33) (0.26) (0.25)
Duality -0.12 ** -0.10 * -0.15 ** -0.13 * -0.10 † -0.12 * -0.08 † -0.16 **
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Size -0.03 -0.00 -0.02  0.00 -0.01  0.02 -0.02  0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 †  0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROE  0.39 ***  0.61 ***  0.44 **  0.33  0.25 *  0.35 **  0.37 ***  0.24 †
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.25) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.16 *  0.01 -0.16 ** -0.04 -0.17 ** -0.02 -0.17 ** -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
intercept  3.27 ***  1.62 †  3.47 ***  2.67 **  3.21 ***  2.27 ***  2.88 ***  2.45 ***
(0.54) (0.90) (0.39) (0.93) (0.72) (0.62) (0.49) (0.41)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
d.f.
AR(1) ** *** *** ** † * * ***
AR(2)
Hansen
d.f.
Unstandardized coefficients. 
†p<0.10; *p<0.05;**p<0.01;***p<0.001
              0.16               0.16               0.35
             -3.31             -2.30
            28.26            25.33             28.70
Model 15
(27, 58)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
         (27)         (33)          (36)        (33)         (36)         (41)          (24)
            28.96             26.55             22.27             24.57
             -0.05               0.29               0.18               0.04
             -3.70              -3.47
(24, 58) (26, 58)
             -2.93              -1.76              -2.50
            28.53
         (27)
(24, 58)
             -2.79
              0.10
   7110000.00             90.96
(26, 58) (27, 58) (30, 58) (23, 58)
        1849.04    5980000.00   1790000.00          244.34  19900000.00           312.94
Model 13 Model 14
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APPENDIX 
ITEMS OF THE MERCO INDEX 
1. Financial and Economic Performance
a. Book profit
b. Profitability
c. Quality of economic information
2. Quality of Product or Service
a. Product value
b. Brand value
c. Customer service
3. Corporate Culture and Workplace Quality
a. Suitability of corporate culture to business project
b. Workplace quality
c. Valuation and reward
4. Ethics and Corporate Social Performance
a. Business ethics
b. Commitment to the community
c. Social and environmental responsibility
5. Global Dimension and International Presence
a. International expansion
b. Strategic alliances
c. Online relation with stakeholders (strategic position in the web)
6. Innovation
a. R&D investment
b. Renewal of product and services portfolio
c. New channels of distribution
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